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 Managerial Incentives and Management Forecast Precision 
 
Abstract: 
Managers have great discretion in determining forecast characteristics, but little is known about 
how managerial incentives affect these characteristics. This paper examines whether managers 
strategically choose forecast precision for self-serving purposes. Building on the prior finding 
that the market reaction to vague forecasts is weaker than its reaction to precise forecasts, we 
find that for management forecasts disclosed before insider sales, more positive (negative) news 
forecasts are more (less) precise than other management forecasts. The opposite applies to 
management forecasts disclosed before insider purchases. These results are consistent with 
managers strategically choosing forecast precision to increase stock prices before insider sales 
and to decrease stock prices before insider purchases. Additional analyses indicate that the 
impact of managerial incentives on forecast precision is less pronounced when institutional 
ownership is high or when disclosure risk is high, and is more pronounced when investors have 
difficulty in assessing the precision of managers’ information. 
 
Keywords: Management Forecast; Managerial Incentives; Insider Trading; Forecast Precision 
 
Data Availability: The data used in this study are publicly available from the sources indicated 
in the text.
 1 
I. Introduction 
Issuing earnings forecasts is an important channel that managers use to convey information 
to investors. Unlike mandatory disclosures such as annual reports, management forecasts are 
voluntary, and managers have considerable discretion on whether and how to provide earnings 
forecasts. Motivated by the usefulness of management forecasts, prior research has examined 
extensively what determines their frequency (e.g., Skinner 1994, 1997; Lang and Lundholm 
2000; Cheng and Lo 2006). Yet despite the considerable discretion that managers have in issuing 
the forecasts and the importance of such characteristics as forecast precision, forecast horizon, 
and supplementary disclosure to market reactions, it is not well understood how managers’ 
incentives affect these characteristics (Hutton et al. 2003; Hirst et al. 2008).  
In this paper, we focus on one important characteristic of management forecasts––forecast 
precision––and examine how managerial incentives affect the choice of forecast precision. We 
choose to focus on forecast precision, or specificity, for two reasons. First, precision is one of the 
most important forecast characteristics over which managers have a great deal of discretion. 
Managers can issue qualitative or quantitative forecasts, and the latter may take the form of point 
forecasts, range forecasts, or open-ended forecasts. More than 80 percent of the quantitative 
forecasts compiled by Thomas Financial are in the range format of estimates with explicit upper 
and lower bounds, and there is a large degree of variation in forecast width, the difference 
between the upper and lower bounds. One might even argue that managers have greater 
discretion over the precision of their earnings forecasts than over whether to provide forecasts in 
the first place (Hirst et al. 2008). Managers cannot always withhold information because it is part 
of their fiduciary duty to update and correct previous disclosures. Furthermore, withholding 
information can increase the risk of litigation and can damage a manager’s reputation (Skinner 
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1994).  
Second, forecast precision has a significant effect on market reactions to management 
forecasts. A number of theoretical papers, such as Kim and Verrecchia (1991) and Subramanyam 
(1996), argue that the magnitude of the market reaction to a disclosure is positively related to its 
precision, and empirical studies examining the impact of management forecast precision on stock 
returns and analyst forecast revisions provide support for this argument (e.g., Baginski et al. 
1993; Baginski et al. 2007).  
Building on prior research, we identify the most frequently investigated managerial 
incentive in the voluntary disclosure literature, insider trading, and examine whether it provides 
managers with incentives to choose forecast precision strategically. Given that the precision of 
management forecasts has a significant effect on stock prices––more precise forecasts have a 
larger impact on stock prices than vague forecasts––we argue that trading incentives affect 
forecast precision and that the effect depends on both the sign and magnitude of the news. As 
managers prefer a higher stock price prior to insider sales, we predict that good news disclosed 
before insider sales is more precise, and that the more positive the news is, the more precise the 
forecast is.1 Similarly, we hypothesize that bad news disclosed before insider sales is less 
precise, and that the more negative the news is, the more vague the forecast. In other words, we 
predict a positive association between forecast news and the precision for management forecasts 
issued before insider sales. Given that prior research finds a positive association between forecast 
news and precision (e.g., Skinner 1994; Choi et al. 2010), these arguments imply that the 
association is more positive for management forecasts issued before insider sales than for those 
not followed by insider trading. In contrast, as managers benefit from a lower stock price before 
                                                        
1 In line with prior research, we calculate forecast news as the difference between the mid-point estimate of management 
forecasts of earnings per share (EPS) and the consensus analyst forecast, scaled by the pre-release share price. 
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insider purchases, we predict the opposite for management forecasts disclosed before insider 
purchases, i.e., a less positive association between forecast news and the precision for 
management forecasts issued before insider purchases than for those not followed by insider 
trading. 
To test our hypotheses, we examine a sample of 10,799 management earnings forecasts 
issued in the 1999-2006 period. We use the negative of forecast width (the magnitude of the 
range for range forecasts and zero for point forecasts) to measure forecast precision. To test our 
predictions, we regress forecast precision on forecast news, indicators for insider sales or 
purchases, and their interactions. We also control for other determinants of forecast precision, 
such as managers’ information uncertainty, investors’ demand for information, the passage of 
Regulation Fair Disclosure, equity issuance, and the precision of past management forecasts.  
Consistent with prior research, we find an overall positive association between forecast 
news and forecast precision; the more positive the news is, the more precise the forecast is. More 
importantly, we find that, consistent with our hypotheses, trading incentives systematically affect 
the association between forecast news and precision. We find that forecast precision is more 
positively correlated with forecast news for management forecasts issued before insider sales 
than for other management forecasts. For forecasts issued before insider purchases, we find a less 
positive correlation between forecast news and precision. To highlight the notion that the 
direction of insider trading’s effect on forecast precision depends on the sign of the news, in an 
additional analysis we replace the continuous forecast news variable with indicators for the sign 
of the news. We find that, compared with management forecasts issued at other times, good news 
issued before insider sales is more precise and bad news before insider sales is less precise, 
whereas good news issued before insider purchases is less precise and bad news before insider 
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purchases is more precise. Overall, these results indicate that managers choose to issue forecasts 
in a form that increases these forecasts’ impact on stock prices if that impact is desirable and 
reduces it if it is undesirable.  
To obtain further support for our main inferences and to provide additional insights, we 
also examine three conditioning variables that can affect the relation between managerial 
incentives and forecast precision. First, previous research shows that institutional investors play 
an important monitoring role and demand more transparent disclosure than individual investors 
(e.g., Bushee 1998; Ajinkya et al. 2005; Chen et al. 2007). If this is the case, then managers’ 
strategic behavior is likely to be mitigated by the presence of institutional investors. Consistent 
with this prediction, we find that the effect of trading incentives on the association between 
forecast news and precision is weaker when institutional ownership is high than when it is low. 
Second, while we argue that the risk of strategically changing forecast precision is lower 
than the risk associated with other forms of managerial discretion in the voluntary disclosure 
domain, such as withholding news, it is not risk-free and the extent of the risk varies. The risk of 
disclosing forward-looking information arises in our setting if the information disclosed is 
subsequently proven to be wrong. The more precise the forecast is, the more likely it is to be 
proven wrong because actual earnings may fall outside the forecast range, and thus the higher the 
disclosure risk. Since managers have incentives to increase the precision of their forecasts when 
they disclose good news before selling shares and when they disclose bad news before buying 
shares, the disclosure risk is higher in these cases. In contrast, when managers disclose bad news 
before selling shares or good news before buying shares, they have incentives to decrease the 
precision of their forecasts, leading to lower disclosure risk. Given that managers are less likely 
to engage in strategic behavior when the litigation risk is higher, we posit that managers are less 
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likely to act strategically in the high risk scenario where good news precedes insider sales or bad 
news precedes insider purchases than in the low risk scenario where bad news precedes insider 
sales or good news precedes insider purchases. Our results are consistent with this prediction. 
Third, managers’ ability to choose forecast precision for self-serving purposes depends on 
investors’ ability to assess the precision of managers’ information. If investors are able to “see 
through” the precision game and react accordingly, then strategically choosing forecast precision 
will not benefit managers. Thus, we expect that managers are more likely to strategically choose 
forecast precision when investors have greater difficulty in evaluating the precision of their 
information. Using several variables to capture the level of this difficulty, we find results 
consistent with our prediction. 
We also conduct several additional tests to enrich our analyses and to ensure the robustness 
of our results. First, we replicate prior work supporting our assumption that precise forecasts are 
associated with stronger market reactions than vague forecasts. Second, we find evidence 
suggesting that our results are not driven by the reverse causality (i.e., disclosure precision 
affecting the existence of insider trading) or self-selection in the issuance of management 
forecasts. Third, we find that our results are robust to alternative research design choices, such as 
using the magnitude of insider trading rather than indicators for such trading, and to controlling 
for the effect of contemporaneous earnings announcements for bundled management forecasts. 
Our study contributes to the voluntary disclosure literature in several important ways. First, 
Hirst et al. (2008) suggest that forecast characteristics such as forecast precision are the most 
controllable, yet least studied, dimension of management forecasts. Although several studies 
(Baginski and Hassell 1997; Ajinkya et al. 2005) have examined the economic determinants of 
forecast precision, we extend this line of research by demonstrating the importance of managerial 
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incentives in determining forecast precision. We also investigate the conditions under which the 
impact of managerial incentives is weaker or stronger.  
Second, this study extends the corporate disclosure literature by providing evidence that 
managers strategically determine forecast precision for self-serving purposes. Although several 
studies find that managerial incentives affect corporate disclosure in general and management 
forecast practices in particular, their primary focus is on whether managers overstate earnings 
(e.g., Beneish 1999), disclose information (e.g., Cheng and Lo 2006), or bias the information 
they disclose (e.g., Rogers and Stocken 2005). Our study complements these studies by focusing 
on managers’ discretion in choosing the precision of their forecasts.  
This study builds upon and extends Rogers (2008). Rogers argues that when deciding the 
quality of disclosure in response to insider trading incentives, managers face a tradeoff between 
maintaining their information advantage and reducing litigation risk. He finds that managers tend 
to issue forecasts with high disclosure quality before insider sales to reduce litigation risk, but to 
issue forecasts with low disclosure quality before insider purchases to maintain their information 
advantage. There are two key differences between our study and Rogers (2008). First, we argue 
that managers’ disclosure decisions are a joint function of insider trading incentives and the 
nature of the news disclosed. It is in managers’ best interests to increase (decrease) the quality of 
the disclosure when the market reaction to that disclosure is favorable (unfavorable) to them. Our 
empirical analyses confirm that the quality of management forecasts disclosed before insider 
sales (purchases) varies with forecast news, and it is not uniformly better (worse). For example, 
for management forecasts issued before insider sales, managers prefer to issue more precise 
forecasts for more positive news but less precise forecasts for more negative news. While the 
former can be regarded as of high quality, the latter can be regarded as of low quality. Second, 
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Rogers (2008) uses the change in liquidity around disclosures as a measure of disclosure quality. 
In contrast, we examine an observable action taken by managers and thus provide more 
contextual evidence. The drawback of our approach is that forecast precision is only one aspect 
of managers’ disclosure decisions. In sum, taken together the two studies provide a more 
complete picture of the managerial decision-making process in the choice of voluntary disclosure 
quality.  
Section II next discusses the related literature on management forecasts and develops our 
hypotheses. Section III describes the data and research design. Section IV reports the empirical 
results. Section V presents additional analyses, and Section VI concludes. 
 
II. Related Literature and Hypothesis Development 
Related prior research  
Managers have an information advantage over outside investors, and they rely on both 
mandatory reporting and voluntary disclosure to reduce this information asymmetry. A 
management earnings forecast is one of the most common types of voluntary disclosure and prior 
research finds that management forecasts provide important information to the capital markets 
(e.g., Baginski and Hassell 1990; Pownall et al. 1993; Coller and Yohn 1997; Rogers and 
Stocken 2005; Rogers 2008). Healy and Palepu (2001) and Hirst et al. (2008) review this 
literature.  
Because management forecasts are voluntary, managers have considerable discretion as to 
whether, when, and what to disclose. The extant literature indicates that while managers use 
voluntary disclosure to reduce information asymmetry, they also exploit their discretion over 
such disclosure for self-serving purposes. For example, Aboody and Kasznik (2000) document 
  8  
that managers reduce the exercise price of option grants by disclosing bad news and withholding 
good news prior to option grant dates. Lang and Lundholm (2000) find that firms increase the 
frequency of disclosure and issue more favorable news prior to raising external capital. Cheng 
and Lo (2006) document that managers disclose more bad news before buying stocks on their 
personal accounts. Brockman et al. (2008) find that the frequency and magnitude of bad news 
(good news) disclosures are higher (lower) before share repurchases, presumably to deflate stock 
prices so that firms can buy back shares at a lower price. Overall, the evidence in this area 
indicates that the frequency of management forecasts is affected by managers’ incentives.  
Although managers have opportunities to exploit their discretion over earnings forecasts, 
investors can use subsequent audited earnings reports and information from other sources to 
evaluate the credibility of these forecasts.2 If managers are thought to have withheld information 
or issued biased forecasts, investors may sue them, and managers’ reputations might be damaged 
(Skinner 1994, 1997). The risk of such litigation is particularly high when insider trading is 
involved. Insider trading is subject to the “disclose or abstain” rule, which requires that insiders 
in possession of material nonpublic information either disclose it to the public before trading or 
abstain from trading. Such litigation risk and ex post discipline greatly restrain managerial 
discretion over whether and what to disclose. Consistent with the notion that managers are 
concerned about litigation risk, Cheng and Lo (2006) find that managers are not more likely to 
withhold bad news or issue good news before insider sales. Consistent with the disciplinary role 
of subsequent earnings reports in reducing management forecast bias, Rogers and Stocken 
(2005) find that managers have incentives to provide biased forecasts only when investors have 
difficulty in detecting that bias. 
                                                        
2 Hutton et al. (2003) argue and find that managers provide supplementary disclosure to increase the credibility of their forecasts. 
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This study takes the decision to issue management forecasts as a given and explores how 
managerial incentives affect managers’ decisions regarding forecast precision. Compared to 
withholding information or providing biased forecasts, providing information with desirable 
precision is subject to lower litigation risk. Managers can issue point, range, or qualitative 
estimates, and for range forecasts, they can choose the size of the range. The literature suggests 
that forecast precision affects the market reaction to earnings guidance. For example, Kim and 
Verrecchia (1991) and Subramanyam (1996) show that more precise information leads to a 
larger market reaction. Consistent with the theoretical prediction, Baginski et al. (1993) find that 
point forecasts are associated with a greater market reaction than range forecasts.3 If more 
precise forecasts are associated with stronger market reactions, then managers can strategically 
choose forecast precision to influence the market reaction for self-serving purposes. Indeed, 
Hughes and Pae (2004) show analytically that entrepreneurs who plan to sell shares choose high 
precision for good news to increase stock prices and low precision for bad news to mitigate the 
decline in stock prices.  
In the next section, we discuss how managerial incentives can affect the precision of 
management forecasts. We focus on insider trading, the incentive most often examined by prior 
research. 
 
Hypothesis development – Insider trading, forecast news, and forecast precision 
When managers trade shares of their companies on their personal accounts, they have 
incentives to increase trading gains by utilizing their information advantage. Penman (1982) and 
                                                        
3 Other studies (e.g., Pownall et al. 1993), however, find an insignificant relation between market response and forecast form. In 
a recent working paper, Baginski et al. (2007) confirm the finding in Baginski et al. (1993). We also confirm these results in this 
study. See Section V for details. 
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Noe (1999) find that managers sell more shares after good news than after bad news, and buy 
more shares after bad news than after good news, suggesting that managers strategically choose 
the timing of their trading activities to increase insider trading gains. Building on these findings, 
Cheng and Lo (2006) argue that managers may change the frequency of voluntary disclosure 
before insider trading and find that managers are more likely to disclose bad news before buying 
shares. Using the change in liquidity to proxy for disclosure quality, Rogers (2008) finds that 
managers strategically change disclosure quality in response to personal trading incentives. He 
finds that disclosure quality is on average higher before insider sales and lower before insider 
purchases. Rogers and Stocken (2005) document that when the market has difficulty detecting 
managers’ misreporting, managers are more likely to issue optimistic (pessimistic) earnings 
forecasts before insider sales (purchases). 
However, withholding information or issuing biased forecasts is subject to substantial 
litigation risk (e.g., Skinner 1994; Cheng and Lo 2006). Under the “disclose or abstain” rule, 
managers are obligated to issue forecasts before engaging in insider trading. We argue that given 
the disclosure of news, managers can increase trading gains by manipulating forecast precision to 
influence the market response to the news. Since the benefit of selling shares increases with 
stock prices, we expect that managers are more likely to be vague when issuing negative news 
before insider sales and are more likely to be precise when issuing positive news before insider 
sales. In contrast, because managers benefit from a lower stock price when buying shares, we 
posit that when managers are about to buy stocks, they are more likely to be vague when issuing 
positive news and precise when issuing negative news.  
Note that we expect both the sign and magnitude of the news to affect the forecast 
precision decision. Whether the news is good or bad affects the direction of insider trading’s 
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impact on management forecast precision, whereas the magnitude of the news affects the size of 
that impact. Because news of greater magnitude has a larger impact on stock prices and insider 
trading gains, managers’ incentives to influence forecast precision are expected to be stronger 
when the magnitude of the news is greater. Therefore, we consider how the impact of insider 
trading on forecast precision varies with forecast news. Because previous research (e.g., Skinner 
1994; Choi et al. 2010) finds that on average, better news is more precise than worse news, we 
expect this positive association to be more pronounced for management forecasts issued before 
insider sales and less pronounced for those issued before insider purchases.4 
The above discussion leads to our main hypothesis: 
H1: The association between forecast precision and news is more positive for management 
forecasts issued before insider sales and less positive for forecasts issued before 
insider purchases than it is for other management forecasts.  
 
Hypothesis Development – Conditioning factors 
Institutional ownership 
By strategically disclosing either vague or precise information before insider trading, 
managers can influence the market reaction to management forecasts in the direction that is 
beneficial to them. Such self-serving behavior comes at the expense of current and/or potential 
shareholders. It thus follows that such behavior is less likely to be effective when shareholders 
are able to monitor managers closely. Prior research documents that institutional investors can 
serve as effective monitors and usually demand more transparent corporate disclosure (e.g., 
Bushee and Noe 2000; Healy and Palepu 2001). Institutional investors often attend conference 
calls and closely follow management earnings forecasts. In addition, they collect firm-specific 
                                                        
4 Prior research attributes the positive association between forecast news and precision to managers’ preference for higher stock 
prices in general, or in other words, to their preference for stronger reactions to good news and weaker reactions to bad news. 
Because of this general trend, we do not state our hypothesis as the net association between forecast news and precision before 
insider trading.  
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information from various sources on an ongoing basis and strive to reduce their information 
disadvantage. Consistent with these arguments, Bamber and Cheon (1998) find that firms with 
block shareholders issue more precise forecasts, and Ajinkya et al. (2005) find that firms with 
higher institutional ownership are more likely to issue precise earnings forecasts.  
If institutional investors can effectively monitor managers’ forecast behavior and demand 
more transparent disclosure, they can restrain managers from engaging in strategic behavior in 
choosing forecast precision. Thus our second hypothesis is as follows: 
 H2: The impact of insider trading incentives on management forecast precision, as 
hypothesized in H1, is less pronounced for firms with high institutional ownership than 
for firms with low institutional ownership. 
 
Disclosure risk 
Although we argue that a strategic decision regarding management forecast precision is 
subject to less risk than withholding news or providing biased forecasts, it is not risk-free, and 
the extent of the risk varies. The risk that is associated with the disclosure of forward-looking 
information, or disclosure risk in short, arises in our setting if the information disclosed is 
subsequently proven to be wrong (Cheng and Lo 2006). The more precise the forecast is, the 
more likely it is to be proven wrong (i.e., the actual earnings may fall outside the forecast range), 
and the higher the disclosure risk (Choi et al. 2010). As previously discussed, managers have 
incentives to increase the precision of management forecasts when they disclose good news 
before selling shares or when they disclose bad news before buying shares, leading to greater 
disclosure risk. In contrast, when managers disclose bad news before selling shares or good news 
before buying shares, they have incentives to decrease the precision of their forecasts, and this 
can reduce disclosure risk because forecasts with wider ranges are less likely to be proven wrong 
(i.e., the actual earnings are more likely to fall inside the forecast range). Because managers are 
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less likely to engage in strategic behavior when the litigation risk is high (e.g., Baginski et al. 
2002), we expect that managers are less likely to act strategically in choosing management 
forecast precision in the high disclosure risk scenario in which good news precedes insider sales 
or bad news precedes insider purchases than in the low risk scenario in which bad news precedes 
insider sales or good news precedes insider purchases.5  
The above discussion leads to the following hypothesis: 
 H3: The impact of insider trading incentives on management forecast precision, as 
hypothesized in H1, is less pronounced in the high disclosure risk scenario in which 
good news precedes insider sales or bad news precedes insider purchases than in the 
low risk scenario in which bad news precedes insider sales or good news precedes 
insider purchases.  
 
Investors’ ability to assess the precision of managers’ information 
Rogers and Stocken (2005) argue that the likelihood of managers providing biased 
forecasts depends on investors’ ability to evaluate the accuracy of the disclosed information. In a 
similar vein, we argue that investors’ ability to assess the precision of management’s information 
is important if managers strategically choose the forecast precision and guide the market for their 
own benefit. When investors can estimate the precision of managers’ information with a fair 
degree of accuracy, they are doubtful of forecasts that deviate from the expected precision level. 
For example, if investors assume that managers have received a precise signal about future 
earnings, managers are less able to effectively use their discretion to blur the forecast. Similarly, 
if investors believe that managers cannot precisely estimate future performance, managers have 
weaker incentive to strategically choose forecast precision levels for self-serving purposes. In 
contrast, if investors do not know the precision level of the information that managers have, 
managers can strategically choose the forecast precision level. Thus our final hypothesis is: 
                                                        
5 Note that the discussion of the variation in disclosure risk underlying H3 is within the setting of strategically choosing forecast 
precision. It has no bearing on other strategic decisions, such as the withholding of information. 
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H4: The impact of insider trading incentives on management forecast precision, as 
hypothesized in H1, is more pronounced if investors have greater difficulty in 
assessing the precision of managers’ information.  
 
III. Data and Empirical Design 
Sample and data 
We obtain our sample of management forecasts over the 1999-2006 period from the First 
Call Historical Database. We include both quarterly and annual forecasts of earnings per share 
(EPS) for the current quarter or year.6 To focus on voluntary earnings forecasts, we exclude 
pre-announcement forecasts issued after the corresponding fiscal period-end.7 Unlike some 
previous studies (e.g., Cheng and Lo 2006), we cannot use the market reaction to earnings 
forecasts to capture the nature of news because our focus, forecast precision, affects the 
magnitude of market reaction. Instead, we determine the nature of news based on the comparison 
between management forecasts and the prevailing consensus analyst forecasts. Accordingly, we 
exclude qualitative and open-ended forecasts. The foregoing procedure leaves us with an initial 
sample of 41,543 management forecasts.  
From this initial sample, we exclude forecasts for which the other data we require for our 
analyses are missing. First, we exclude 15,387 observations for which the data needed to 
calculate regression variables other than forecast news are missing from the Compustat, Center 
for Research in Security Prices (CRSP), or Institutional Brokers’ Estimate System (I/B/E/S) 
databases. Second, we exclude 11,616 management forecasts for which there are no 
corresponding analyst forecast data and for which we are thus unable to determine forecast 
                                                        
6 If there are both quarterly and annual forecasts on the same day, we retain only the former because quarterly forecasts, on 
average, have a larger effect on the market than annual forecasts (e.g., Pownall et al. 1993; Baginski et al. 1993). 
7 Earnings forecasts issued during a quarter do not need to be furnished to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), 
whereas pre-announcements after the quarter end must be. 
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news.8 Finally, when the consensus analyst forecast for an observation falls within the range of 
the management forecast, we cannot unambiguously classify it as good or bad news. To increase 
the power of our tests, we thus follow Baginski et al. (1993) and exclude 3,741 such observations, 
although including them in the analyses leads to qualitatively similar results.9 This sample 
selection procedure leaves us with a final sample of 10,799 management earnings forecasts 
issued by 1,991 unique firms.  
Panel A of Table 1 reports the yearly and quarterly distribution of management forecasts. 
The table indicates an overall increase in forecast frequency and/or First Call coverage over the 
sample period, with 267 forecasts issued in 1999 and 2,169 issued in 2006. Management 
forecasts are distributed roughly evenly across the four fiscal quarters, with fewer in the first 
quarter and more in the fourth. In our sample, 2,185 management forecasts (20.23 percent of the 
sample) are point estimates and 8,614 (79.77 percent) are range estimates. This untabulated 
distribution highlights the variation in forecast precision. 
(Place Table 1 Here) 
Panel B of Table 1 reports the frequency of management forecasts by the sign of the 
forecast news. Forecast news is calculated as the difference between the mid-point estimate of 
the management forecast of EPS and the consensus analyst forecast, scaled by the pre-release 
share price. Because we use the average of analyst forecasts and the point estimate or mid-point 
of the range forecast to calculate forecast news, this variable is exactly zero in less than 0.5 
percent of the sample. Following prior research (e.g., Clement et al. 2003; Rogers and Van 
                                                        
8 As an alternative, we also use the random walk model to determine the market expectation for observations without analyst 
forecasts, and doing so leads to qualitatively similar results.  
9 By “quantitatively similar results,” we mean that the coefficients on the variables are almost the same and the p-values are in 
the same range (e.g., higher than 0.10, [0.05, 0.10], [0.01, 0.05), smaller than 0.01). By “qualitatively similar results,” we mean 
that the coefficients on the variables of interest are similar with small differences and the coefficients remain significant (p-value 
equal to or smaller than 0.10) or insignificant (p-value higher than 0.10).  
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Buskirk 2011), we treat management forecasts with forecast news of a small magnitude as 
neutral forecasts. More specifically, we classify management forecasts for which the absolute 
value of the forecast news is in the bottom quintile of the sample distribution as neutral news. 
We classify other forecasts as good (bad) news forecasts if forecast news is positive (negative). 
As reported in Panel B, 3,555 management forecasts (33 percent of the sample) are classified as 
good news, 5,067 (47 percent) as bad news, and 2,177 (20 percent) as neutral news.10 The higher 
frequency of bad news is consistent with the literature starting with Skinner (1994) and suggests 
that managers are more likely to disclose bad news, presumably to reduce litigation risk.  
 
Measurement of key variables 
Management forecast range (Width) and forecast precision (Precision). For range 
forecasts, Width is calculated as the difference between the upper- and lower-end estimates, 
divided by the absolute value of the mid-point forecast. Width is 0 for point forecasts.11 As 
reported in Table 2, the mean (median) of Width is 0.117 (0.053), suggesting that the mean 
(median) range is 11.7 percent (5.3 percent) of the mid-point of the forecast. More importantly, 
there is a large variation in forecast width, which ranges from 0 (5th percentile) to 0.462 (95th 
percentile).  
(Place Table 2 Here) 
For ease of interpretation, we use the negative of the forecast range as the dependent 
variable; that is, forecast precision (Precision) is Width times -1. A larger value of Precision 
indicates a more precise management forecast. 
                                                        
10 The proportions of good, bad, and neutral news forecasts are similar to those reported in the prior research (e.g., Lennox and 
Park 2006). Using other criteria to define neutral news, such as the bottom 10 percent, 15 percent, 25 percent, or 30 percent, leads 
to quantitatively similar results. 
11 We find qualitatively similar results when we use the pre-forecast stock price as the deflator.  
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Management forecast news (FN). FN is calculated as the difference between the point or 
the mid-point estimate of the management forecast of EPS and the consensus analyst forecast, 
scaled by the pre-release share price. The consensus analyst forecast is calculated as the average 
of the analyst forecasts issued in the 90 days before the management forecast.12 To be consistent 
with quarterly forecasts, FN is divided by 4 for annual forecasts. Both the mean and median of 
FN are significantly negative (p < 0.01 based on untabulated tests). 
Insider trading (InsiderSell, InsiderBuy). We obtain insider trading data from Thomson 
Financial. An insider is defined as a person who serves as the CEO, president, or a director. We 
include all open market transactions of a firm’s shares or options. As the volume of insider 
trading is highly skewed, we define two indicator variables, InsiderSell and InsiderBuy, to 
capture the existence of insider trading over the 30-day window after the management forecast. 
InsiderSell equals 1 when the net insider trading is a net sale, such that insider sales are higher 
than insider purchases, and 0 otherwise. InsiderBuy equals 1 when the net insider trading is a net 
purchase, and 0 otherwise. Within our sample, 2,831 forecasts (26 percent of the sample) are 
followed by insider sales, 1,417 (13 percent) by insider purchases, and the remainder (61 percent) 
by no insider trading.13 
Because prior research finds that managers are more likely to disclose good news before 
insider sales and bad news before insider purchases, we first determine whether there are any 
observations in our sample with bad news before insider sales and good news before insider 
purchases. Panel B of Table 1 presents the distribution of management forecasts according to 
                                                        
12 We use the 90-day period to reduce the influence of stale analyst forecasts. Furthermore, if an analyst issues more than one 
earnings forecast in this period, we run a robustness test using only the most recent forecast issued by that analyst, and obtain 
quantitatively similar results. 
13 Rogers (2008) also finds that there are more management forecasts followed by insider sales than by insider purchases. 
However, the total proportion of management forecasts followed by insider trading is higher in our study than in his, most likely 
for two non-exclusive reasons. First, our sample periods are different. Rogers’s sample period is 1994-2002, whereas ours is 
1999-2006. We find that insider trading activities have increased substantially in recent years. Second, our sample selection 
criteria are different. Unlike Rogers (2008), we require analyst forecast data and exclude qualitative forecasts. 
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whether they are followed by insider sales or purchases. Of the management forecasts issued 
before insider sales, 41 percent are good news forecasts and 31 percent are bad news forecasts. 
Of those issued before insider purchases, 28 percent are good news forecasts and 52 percent are 
bad news forecasts. In other words, there are more good news forecasts than bad news forecasts 
before insider sales and more bad news forecasts than good news forecasts before insider 
purchases. This observation is consistent with the findings in previous studies (e.g., Cheng and 
Lo 2006). However, the frequency with which bad news appears prior to insider sales and good 
news prior to insider purchases is not trivial, consistent with managers’ fiduciary duty to provide 
information that updates and corrects previous disclosures (Skinner 1994; Cheng and Lo 2006).  
 
Empirical Design 
We estimate the following model to examine the effect of insider trading incentives on the 
relation between forecast news and forecast precision:14 




VariablesControlδInsiderBuyFNInsiderBuy
lInsiderSelFNlInsiderSelFNPrecision
54
3210 ,    (1) 
where Precision is management forecast precision, FN is forecast news, InsiderSell is an 
indicator for net insider sales, and InsiderBuy is an indicator for net insider purchases. As 
previously discussed, we expect forecast precision and forecast news to be positively correlated, 
implying that β1 is expected to be positive. To test H1, we interact FN with InsiderSell and 
InsiderBuy, respectively. H1 predicts that β3 is positive and β5 is negative. We use 
firm-clustering adjusted standard errors to account for the possible correlations between 
observations of the same firm, as suggested in Peterson (2009). 
                                                        
14 Because Precision is 0 for point forecasts, we also use Tobit regression to estimate Equation (1) and the other models in the 
paper in an untabulated sensitivity test, and the inferences remain the same. By “inferences remain the same,” we mean that the 
untabulated results are consistent with the reported results in supporting or rejecting the hypotheses. 
  19  
The control variables include a set of variables that are likely to influence management 
forecast precision. First, prior research finds that forecast precision decreases with the 
uncertainty that managers face when providing forecasts (e.g., Rogers and Stocken 2005). We 
proxy for uncertainty using forecast error (FE), an indicator variable of negative earnings (Loss), 
forecast horizon (Horizon), return volatility (RetVol), and research and development expenditure 
(R&D). We expect negative coefficients on these five variables. Second, prior research indicates 
that managers are more likely to provide precise forecasts when the demand for information is 
higher (e.g., Baginski and Hassel 1997; Ajinkya et al. 2005; Lennox and Park 2006). We use 
analyst coverage (Analyst), institutional ownership (INST), firm size (Size), and growth 
opportunities (proxied for by the market-to-book ratio, M/B) to capture the capital markets’ 
demand for information. We expect positive coefficients on these variables. Third, we include an 
indicator variable for the post-Regulation Fair Disclosure period (FD) and an indicator for 
industries with high litigation risk (Litigation). We expect negative coefficients on these 
variables. We also include indicator variables for optimistic management forecasts (Optimism) 
and annual forecasts (Annual) because of their potential impact on forecast precision, although 
we do not have predictions on these variables.  
Fourth, we include the square of forecast news to control for potential non-linearity (Choi 
et al. 2010) and the interactions between forecast news and several control variables (i.e., 
Litigation, Horizon, and Loss) to control for their potential effects on the relation between 
forecast news and forecast precision. In a sensitivity test, we also include the interaction terms 
between FN and all of the other control variables, and our results on insider trading are 
quantitatively similar. Fifth, like insider sales, equity issuance can also motivate managers to 
strategically affect stock prices through voluntary disclosure (e.g., Lang and Lundholm 2000). 
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Accordingly, we include an indicator for equity issuance (EquIssue) and its interaction with 
forecast news. We expect positive coefficient on this interaction term. Finally, despite our 
efforts, we might still miss important determinants of forecast precision. We include past 
management forecast precision (PPrecision) to control for the impact of time-invariant omitted 
factors. The Appendix provides the variable definitions for the control variables. 
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics on control variables. The average forecast error is 
0.003; 7.3 percent of the firms have a loss; the average forecast horizon is 124 days; the average 
return volatility is 0.027; the average R&D expenditure is 5.1 percent of sales; the average 
analyst coverage is 8.21; the average institutional ownership is 65.1 percent; the average M/B is 
3.64; and the average firm size is $9,235 million. About 94 percent of the forecasts are issued 
after 2000; 29.8 percent are issued by firms in industries with high litigation risk; 30.5 percent 
are optimistic when compared with ex post earnings realization; 30 percent of past forecasts are 
point forecasts; 1 percent of the forecasts are followed by equity issuance; and 35.1 percent are 
annual forecasts.15  
Table 3 provides the correlations for the independent variables. The magnitude of these 
coefficients and the variance inflation factor (VIF) test suggest that multi-collinearity is not an 
issue in our empirical tests. 
(Place Table 3 Here) 
 
IV. Main Analyses 
In this section, we first examine the impact of managerial incentives on forecast precision, 
and we then examine how the three conditioning factors affect the relation between managerial 
                                                        
15 The descriptive statistics on control variables are similar to those reported in other studies (e.g., Rogers 2008; Rogers et al. 
2009; Yang 2012). 
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incentives and forecast precision. 
 
Managerial incentives, forecast news, and forecast precision – Results for H1  
Panel A of Table 4 reports the regression results for Equation (1) using the continuous 
variable of forecast news. To facilitate comparison with the findings of Rogers (2008), the two 
columns under the “Model (1)” heading report the results for the base model. As reported in the 
table, FN (Forecast News) has a positive coefficient, thus confirming the positive correlation 
between forecast news and forecast precision. As previously discussed, Rogers (2008) uses the 
change in liquidity as a measure of disclosure quality and finds that disclosures before insider 
sales are of higher quality and those before insider purchases are of lower quality. To the extent 
that more (less) precise forecasts are of higher (lower) quality, Rogers’s results imply a positive 
coefficient on InsiderSell and a negative coefficient on InsiderBuy. Consistent with Rogers 
(2008), we find that the coefficient on InsiderSell is significantly positive (p = 0.059), suggesting 
that management forecasts issued before insider sales are more precise. However, the coefficient 
on InsiderBuy, although negative, is insignificant. The difference in results between the two 
studies may be driven by differences in the samples and the measurement of disclosure quality.16 
Overall, our results are consistent with Rogers’s (2008) for insider sales, but not for insider 
purchases.  
(Place Table 4 Here) 
The two columns under the “Model (2)” heading in Panel A of Table 4 report the results of 
testing H1. The coefficient on FN × InsiderSell is significantly positive (p = 0.001), suggesting 
that the positive correlation between forecast news and precision is stronger for management 
                                                        
16 Rogers’s (2008) findings on disclosure quality before insider purchases are relatively weak, with the impact of insider 
purchases on disclosure quality being insignificant in several of his model specifications. 
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forecasts issued before insider sales than for those issued at other times. In other words, 
consistent with H1, prior to insider sales managers issue more precise forecasts when the news is 
more positive to increase the positive price reaction, and they issue less precise forecasts when 
the news is more negative to reduce the price drop. 
Also as expected, the coefficient on FN × InsiderBuy is significantly negative (p = 0.001), 
indicating that the positive correlation between forecast news and precision is weaker for 
forecasts issued before insider purchases. In other words, consistent with H1, prior to insider 
purchases managers issue less precise forecasts when the news is more positive to decrease the 
positive price reaction, and they issue more precise forecasts when the news is more negative to 
increase the price drop. 
This analysis highlights the difference between our study and Rogers (2008). Rogers 
focuses on the main effect of insider trading on the quality of management forecasts regardless 
of the nature of the news, whereas our analysis examines how the impact of insider trading on 
management forecast precision varies with forecast news. The positive coefficient on InsiderSell 
indicates that management forecasts issued before insider sales are more precise than those that 
are not followed by insider trading. This finding is consistent with Rogers. However, we find that 
more positive news is associated with more precise forecasts and more negative news is 
associated with less precise forecasts. Similarly, for management forecasts issued before insider 
purchases, the negative coefficient on InsiderBuy is consistent with Rogers’s findings, but we 
find that the more positive the news is, the less precise the forecast is, and the more negative the 
news is, the more precise the forecast is. Put together, the findings of the two studies imply that 
both litigation concerns, as Rogers (2008) argues, and insider trading considerations, which we 
emphasize, are important determinants of management forecast quality in general and forecast 
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precision in particular.17 
The results for most of the control variables are consistent with prior research. For 
example, we find that managers with an uncertain information set are more likely to provide 
vague forecasts and are more likely to provide precise forecasts when the market demand for 
information is higher. Furthermore, managers are more likely to issue vague forecasts when the 
forecast is optimistic, potentially because of litigation concerns, and they are more likely to issue 
precise forecasts when the forecast is an annual forecast. We also find forecast precision to be 
sticky; firms that issued more precise forecasts in the past continue to issue precise forecasts in 
the future. With respect to the interaction terms, we find that the positive association between 
forecast news and precision is stronger in industries with greater litigation risk, weaker for firms 
reporting a loss, and stronger for management forecasts issued before equity issuance.  
Overall, we find the impact of insider trading on forecast precision to vary with forecast 
news. For management forecasts issued before insider sales, the more positive the news, the 
more precise the forecast, and vice versa. Such a strategy can increase the stock price or reduce 
the impact of bad news before insider sales. In contrast, for management forecasts issued before 
insider purchases, the more positive the news, the less precise the forecast, and vice versa. This 
evidence is consistent with our hypothesis that managers strategically choose forecast precision 
for self-serving purposes. 
Our hypothesis suggests that both the sign and magnitude of forecast news matter in the 
relation between insider trading and forecast precision, and accordingly we use the continuous 
variable of forecast news (FN) in Equation (1) to capture the effects of both. However, it is 
unclear whether the results reported thus far are driven by the magnitude of a given sign. To 
                                                        
17 Rogers (2008) also discusses the impact of insider trading incentives. However, he posits that these incentives prompt 
managers to issue low-quality forecasts to maintain their information advantage, regardless of the nature of the news.  
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investigate whether the results hold for the sign of the news and to further highlight the notion 
that the direction of insider trading’s impact on forecast precision depends on the sign of the 
news, we estimate the following regression: 






VariablesControlδBadInsiderBuyGoodInsiderBuyInsiderBuy
BadlInsiderSelGoodlInsiderSellInsiderSel
BadGoodPrecision
232221
131211
020100 , (1') 
where Good (Bad) is an indicator variable for good (bad) news forecasts. Our hypothesis implies 
that β12 and β23 are positive and that β13 and β22 are negative. The research design is similar to 
Equation (1). 
Panel B of Table 4 reports the regression results. The coefficient on InsiderSell × Good is 
significantly positive, and that on InsiderSell × Bad is significantly negative, thus suggesting that 
good (bad) news forecasts issued before insider sales are more (less) precise than good (bad) 
news forecasts not followed by insider trading. Also in line with our expectations, we find the 
coefficient on InsiderBuy × Good to be significantly negative and that on InsiderBuy × Bad to be 
significantly positive. This result suggests that good (bad) news forecasts issued before insider 
purchases are less (more) precise than good (bad) news forecasts not followed by insider trading. 
That is, the results reported in Table 4, Panel B confirm that the results reported above hold for 
the sign of the news.  
In untabulated analysis, we further separate small good news forecasts from large good 
news forecasts and small bad news forecasts from large bad news forecasts. We find a significant 
incremental effect for large news, indicating that the magnitude of the news is also important. 
This finding is intuitive. We argue that managers strategically determine forecast precision to 
increase trading profits or to reduce trading losses, such that the more extreme the news, the 
greater the potential gain, and thus the stronger the incentive to make a strategic decision 
concerning forecast precision. Given that the continuous variable FN captures both the sign and 
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magnitude of forecast news, we use it in the following analyses. The inferences remain the same 
when we use good news and bad news indicators in the following analyses. 
 
Conditioning analyses 
We use the following regression model to test hypotheses H2-H4: 










VariablesControlδ
VariablengConditioniInsiderBuyFNInsiderBuyFNInsideBuy
VariablengConditionilInsiderSelFNlInsiderSelFNlInsiderSel
FNPrecision
323130
222120
10
,  (2) 
where Conditioning_Variable is one of the three conditioning factors used to test hypotheses 
H2-H4. In this regression, coefficients 22 and 32 capture the way in which the conditioning 
factor affects the strategic behavior related to insider trading, or more specifically, the effect that 
insider trading has on the association between forecast news and forecast precision.  
H2 predicts that managers’ incentive to strategically choose forecast precision is weaker in 
firms with higher institutional ownership. We test H2 by replacing the conditioning variable in 
Equation (2) with IH, the decile rank of institutional ownership standardized to [0,1]. H2 implies 
that 22 is negative and 32 is positive. The results for Model (1) in Table 5 show that the 
coefficient on FN × InsiderSell × IH is significantly negative (p = 0.004), and that on FN × 
InsiderBuy × IH is significantly positive (p = 0.043), suggesting that managers are less likely to 
strategically choose forecast precision when institutional ownership is high than when it is low. 
This result is consistent with the argument underlying H2 that institutional investors’ monitoring 
acts as a restraint against managers’ opportunistic behavior in choosing forecast precision.18 
(Place Table 5 Here) 
                                                        
18 Another commonly used proxy for external monitoring is board independence. We conduct a similar analysis and find 
relatively weak evidence that the strategic behavior is less pronounced in firms with high board independence. This is consistent 
with the mixed findings in prior research. Karamanou and Vafeas (2005) find that forecast precision increases with board 
independence, whereas Ajinkya et al. (2005) find no such evidence.  
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H3 predicts that managers are less likely to use forecast precision for self-serving purposes 
when good news precedes insider sales or when bad news precedes insider purchases. In both 
cases, managers have to balance the potential benefits of an increase in forecast precision with 
the potential increase in disclosure risk arising from more precise forecasts being more likely to 
be proven wrong. We construct an indicator variable, DRISK, which is 1 for these cases and 0 for 
others (i.e., bad news preceding insider sales and good news preceding insider purchases), and 
then interact it with FN × InsiderSell and FN × InsiderBuy. H3 implies that 22 is negative and 
32 is positive. The two columns under “Model (2)” of Table 5 report the regression results. The 
coefficient on FN × InsiderSell × DRISK is significantly negative (p = 0.001), and that on FN × 
InsiderBuy × DRISK is significantly positive (p = 0.001), suggesting that managers are less 
likely to choose forecast precision strategically when disclosure risk is high than when it is low.  
H4 predicts that managers are more likely to choose forecast precision for self-serving 
purposes when investors have more difficulty in assessing the precision of the information that 
managers possess. To investigate this issue, we follow Rogers and Stocken (2005) and construct 
a variable to capture such difficulty. More specifically, we construct a common factor based on 
six variables: the standard deviation of analyst forecasts outstanding when the management 
forecast is released, the standard deviation of analyst forecast errors in the five years prior to the 
management forecast release, an indicator for whether the firm has a loss preceding the forecast, 
the standard deviation of daily stock returns in the year before the forecast date, the average 
bid-ask spread for the 10 days before the forecast date, and the standard deviation of the 
management forecast ranges before the current forecast. We then construct a variable (DIFF), 
which is the decile rank of the difficulty factor standardized to [0,1], with large values indicating 
more difficulty in assessing the precision of managers’ information, and interact it with FN × 
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InsiderSell and FN × InsiderBuy. H4 implies that 22 is positive and 32 is negative.19  
The two columns under the “Model (3)” heading in Table 5 report the regression results. 
The coefficient on FN × InsiderSell × DIFF is significantly positive (p = 0.003), and that on FN 
× InsiderBuy × DIFF is significantly negative (p = 0.029). These results indicate that, as H4 
predicts, when investors have more difficulty in assessing the precision of managers’ information, 
managers are more likely to choose forecast precision strategically.  
The two columns under the heading “Model (4)” in Table 5 include all of the 
aforementioned interaction terms to test the three hypotheses simultaneously. The results are 
consistent with those previously discussed, indicating that the three conditioning variables 
capture different constructs affecting managers’ strategic use of forecast precision to influence 
market perceptions. 
In sum, we find that managers’ strategic behavior in the choice of forecast precision for 
self-serving purposes is mitigated by institutional investors’ monitoring and the risk concerns 
arising from an increase in the precision of forecasts, but facilitated by investors’ difficulty in 
evaluating the precision of managers’ information.  
 
V. Additional Analyses 
This section first examines whether precise forecasts are associated with stronger market 
reactions than vague forecasts, as reported in prior research. We then conduct several tests to 
evaluate the robustness of our results. The results are not tabulated to save space, unless noted.  
 
                                                        
19 We conduct a series of sensitivity tests to ensure that our results are robust to alternative measures of DIFF. For example, we 
use a common factor after dropping any one of the six variables, or a common factor after dropping the two variables with the 
lowest loadings in common factor analysis. The results of these tests are qualitatively similar. 
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Are more precise forecasts associated with stronger market reactions? 
As discussed in Section II, one of the key assumptions in our theoretical argument is that 
more precise forecasts are associated with stronger market reactions than less precise forecasts. 
This section examines this issue by estimating the following regression: 
  VariablesδControlPrecisionFNβPrecisionFNRet 3210 ,   (3) 
where Ret is the cumulative stock return from the forecast release date to one day after, minus 
the size-decile-matched CRSP index return in the same period. We expect a positive coefficient 
on forecast news (FN). If more precise forecasts are associated with stronger market reactions, 
then we would expect a positive coefficient on FN × Precision. We also control for a set of 
variables that prior research suggests are likely to affect the association between stock return and 
forecast news (e.g., Baginski et al. 1993; Pownall et al. 1993).  
Table 6 reports the regression results. As expected, the coefficient on FN is significantly 
positive, which suggests that the market reaction increases with management forecast news. 
More importantly, the coefficient on FN × Precision is significantly positive, indicating that the 
market response to management forecasts is stronger when the forecast is more precise. This 
result is consistent with the finding in prior research and supports the assumption used in our 
hypothesis development. 
 
Self-selection of management forecast issuance 
The sample used in the foregoing analyses only includes firms with management forecasts. 
As management forecasts are voluntary, these analyses might be subject to self-selection bias. As 
is common in the literature, we use Heckman’s (1979) two-stage model to control for the 
potential self-selection bias. In the first stage, we follow Lennox and Park (2006) and Feng et al. 
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(2009) in modeling the likelihood of management issuing forecasts. For the second stage 
regression, we add the inverse Mills ratio to Equation (1), and obtain results quantitatively 
similar to those reported in Panel A of Table 4.  
 
Use of the actual magnitude of insider trading 
The foregoing analyses follow previous studies (e.g., Rogers 2008) in using dummy 
variables to indicate whether managers buy or sell on their own accounts. The use of dummy 
variables makes it easier to interpret the results and increases the power of the tests because 
doing so imposes no restrictions on the specific form of the relation between insider trading and 
managers’ incentives. However, the use of dummy variables neglects the effect of the magnitude 
of trading because the incentive to increase trading gains likely increases with the magnitude of 
trading. In a robustness test, we replicate our main analysis using two alternative measures of the 
magnitude of insider trading. The first is the log transformation of net insider sales (or purchases) 
in dollars. The second is the log transformation of net insider sales (or purchases) calculated 
based on abnormal insider trading, where abnormal insider trading is insider trading in the month 
after the management forecast disclosure less the average insider trading in the previous 
12-month period. Managers of some companies may trade more than their counterparts in others 
for such reasons as a difference in stock-based compensation. As in the main analyses, the 
coefficient on FN × InsiderSell (FN × InsiderBuy) is positive (negative), significant at the 0.003 
level or better. That is, the inference based on the magnitude of insider trading remains the same: 
the positive association between forecast news and precision increases with insider sales and 
decreases with insider purchases.  
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Bundled management forecasts 
Rogers and Van Buskirk (2011) find that management forecasts are usually issued together 
with earnings announcements, which could result in noise and bias in the calculation of forecast 
news. We use two approaches to address this issue. First, following previous studies (e.g., 
Waymire 1984), we replicate the analyses after including unexpected earnings as an additional 
control variable if the management forecast is issued around an earnings announcement. Second, 
we follow the method proposed and validated by Rogers and Van Buskirk (2011) to correct the 
measurement bias of management forecast news. This method estimates the unobservable analyst 
expectation at the time of the earnings announcement and then uses it to calculate forecast news. 
The inferences remain the same when we use these two methods.  
 
The direction of causality 
In the foregoing analyses, we take insider trading as a given and examine how insider 
trading incentives affect the precision of management forecasts. An alternative interpretation is 
that the precision of management forecasts affects stock prices, which in turn affect insider 
trading. This concern is not as serious in the current study as it is in prior research that uses the 
market reaction to measure forecast news. Nevertheless, following Cheng and Lo’s (2006) 
research design, we adopt a two-stage least squares (2SLS) approach to address this concern. We 
first predict insider trading and then use the predicted insider trading to capture managerial 
incentives. The results are quantitatively similar to those reported.  
 
VI. Conclusion 
This study examines whether managers strategically choose the level of forecast precision 
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for self-serving purposes. We find that the positive relation between forecast news and forecast 
precision is stronger for management forecasts issued before insider sales and weaker for those 
issued before insider purchases than for other management forecasts. As more precise forecasts 
are associated with stronger market reactions, these results are consistent with our hypothesis 
that managers strategically choose the level of forecast precision to influence the market reaction 
to their forecasts, thereby increasing their trading gains.  
We also examine three conditioning variables that affect managers’ tendency to manage 
forecast precision. We find that managers are less likely to manage forecast precision when 
institutional ownership is high, presumably because institutional investors can constrain 
managers’ opportunistic behavior through their monitoring. We also find that managers are less 
likely to do so when such a strategy is associated with greater disclosure risk. In contrast, we find 
that managers are more likely to manage forecast precision when investors have more difficulty 
in assessing the precision of their information.  
Our study contributes to the voluntary disclosure literature by examining how managers 
strategically determine forecast precision. Although managers have considerable discretion in 
choosing the characteristics of their forecasts, the research to date sheds little light on how 
managerial incentives affect these characteristics (Hirst et al. 2008). The analyses in this study 
show that managerial incentives can affect forecast precision, thereby furthering our 
understanding of the managerial decision-making process in the issuance of earnings forecasts. 
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Appendix: Variable Measurement 
 
Panel A: Variables used to test management forecast precision hypotheses  
 
Dependent variables 
Width = Forecast width for a range or point forecast, calculated as the difference between 
the high-end estimate and the low-end estimate, divided by the absolute value of 
the mid-point of the estimate; Width is 0 for a point forecast; 
Precision= Management forecast precision, defined as forecast width (Width) times negative 
1; 
 
Independent variables of interest 
FN = Forecast news, calculated as the difference between management forecast of EPS 
(the point or the mid-point of the range forecast) and the consensus analyst 
forecast of EPS issued in the 90 days before management forecast, scaled by the 
pre-release share price; 
InsiderSell= Insider sale indicator, defined as 1 when the net insider trading (total purchases – 
total sales) in the 30 days after the management forecast is negative, and 0 
otherwise; 
InsiderBuy= Insider purchase indicator, defined as 1 when the net insider trading (total 
purchases – total sales) in the 30 days after the management forecast is positive, 
and 0 otherwise; 
Control variables 
Forecast Error= Management forecast error, calculated as the absolute value of the difference 
between actual EPS and the management forecast of EPS, divided by the 
pre-release share price; 
Loss = Loss indicator of actual EPS, defined as 1 if actual EPS is negative, and 0 
otherwise; 
Forecast Horizon = Management forecast horizon, calculated as the number of calendar days 
between the forecast release date and the corresponding earnings announcement 
date; we use the log transformation in the correlation matrix and regression 
analysis; 
Return Volatility= Return volatility, defined as the standard deviation of daily stock returns over the 
250 trading days prior to the management forecast release date; 
R&D= Research and development expenditures divided by sales; 
Analyst Coverage = Analyst coverage, defined as the number of unique analysts who provide 
earnings forecasts in the 90 days before management forecasts; we use the log 
transformation in the correlation matrix and regression analysis; 
INST= Institutional ownership, defined as the percentage of outstanding shares owned 
by institutional investors per 13F in the quarter when management forecast is 
released; 
Size = Firm size, calculated as the firm’s market capitalization (in $million) at the end 
of the quarter before the forecast; we use the log transformation in the 
correlation matrix and regression analysis; 
M/B= Market to book ratio, calculated as the ratio of the market capitalization of equity 
divided by the book value of equity at the end of the quarter before the forecast; 
FD = Indicator variable for post-FD (Regulation Fair Disclosure) period, equal to 1 
when a management forecast is issued after October 2000, and 0 otherwise; 
Litigation = Indicator variable for litigation risk, equal to 1 if firms are within industries with 
high litigation risk (i.e., 4-digit SIC code between 2833 and 2836, 3570 and 
3577, 3600 and 3674, 5200 and 5961, and 7370 and 7374), and 0 otherwise; 
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Optimism = Indicator variable for forecast optimism, 1 if the management forecast (the point 
or the mid-point estimate) is higher than the actual EPS, and 0 otherwise; 
PPrecision = Past management forecast precision, defined as the average precision for all 
management forecasts issued before the current forecast; we use a dummy 
variable to indicate the precision of past management forecasts, equal to 1 for the 
point forecasts, and 0 for the range forecasts; 
Equity Issuance = Indicator variable for the occurrence of equity issuance, equal to 1 if the forecast 
is followed by equity issuance in the next 30 days and 0 otherwise; 
Annual = Indicator variable for forecast of annual earnings, equal to 1 if a forecast is for 
annual earnings and 0 otherwise; 
Conditioning variables 
IH = Decile rank of institutional ownership standardized to [0,1]; IH=0 for firms with 
the lowest decile of institutional ownership and IH=1 for firms with the highest 
decile of institutional ownership; 
DRISK= Indicator for high disclosure risk, 1 if a disclosure of bad news precedes insider 
purchases or a disclosure of good news precedes insider sales, and 0 otherwise; 
DIFF= Decile rank of the difficulty level of assessing the precision of managers’ 
information standardized to [0,1]; DIFF=0 for firms with the lowest decile of 
difficulty level and DIFF=1 for firms with the highest decile of difficulty level; 
the difficulty level is a common factor based on the following six variables: the 
standard deviation of analyst forecasts outstanding when management forecast is 
released, the standard deviation of analyst forecast errors for five years prior to 
the forecast release, whether the firm has a loss preceding the forecast, the 
standard deviation of daily stock returns in the year before the forecast date, the 
average bid-ask spread for the 10 days before the forecast date, and the standard 
deviation of forecast ranges before the current forecast. 
 
Panel B: Additional variables used to test the market reaction to management forecasts 
 
Dependent variables 
Ret= Event period abnormal return for the management forecast, measured as the 
cumulative daily return minus the size-decile-matched market return from the day of 
the forecast to one day after; 
  
Additional control variables 
UE= Earnings surprise, calculated as the difference between actual EPS and the consensus 
analyst forecast of EPS before earnings announcement, scaled by 
pre-earnings-announcement share price; it is set as 0 for management forecasts not 
issued with earnings announcement; 
Multiple= Indicator variable for multiple events, equal to 1 if there is more than one 
announcement (e.g., earnings announcements or other management forecasts), and 0 
otherwise.  
PAccuracy=  Previous management forecast accuracy, defined as the forecast accuracy of 
management forecasts relative to the accuracy of analyst forecasts, averaged over all 
management forecasts issued before the current one. Management forecast accuracy is 
calculated as the absolute value of the difference between actual EPS and management 
forecast, divided by the pre-release share price and then multiplied by minus 1; and 
analyst forecast accuracy is calculated similarly. 
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TABLE 1 
Descriptive Statistics of Management Forecasts 
 
This table describes the characteristics of 10,799 management forecasts of current period’s earnings 
issued in the period 1999-2006.  
 
Panel A: Yearly and quarterly distribution of management forecasts  
 
Year Quarter 1 Quarter 2 Quarter 3 Quarter 4 Total (%) 
1999 45 59 79 84 267 (2.47%) 
2000 58 96 89 171 414 (3.83%) 
2001 181 296 330 357 1,164 (10.78%) 
2002 287 383 380 389 1,439 (13.33%) 
2003 276 360 393 488 1,517 (14.05%) 
2004 340 457 533 530 1,860 (17.22%) 
2005 376 478 505 610 1,969 (18.23%) 
2006 440 573 602 554 2,169 (20.09%) 
 
Total 2,003 2,702 2,911 3,183 10,799 (100%) 
 (18.55%) (25.02%) (26.96%) (29.47%) (100%)  
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TABLE 1 (cont’d) 
Panel B: Management forecast news 
 
Good (bad, neutral) news forecasts refer to management forecasts for which the point estimate, or the mid-point of a range forecast, is above (below, similar 
to) the average of the analyst forecasts issued in the 90 days before the management forecast release date. Management forecasts are classified as neutral news 
if the absolute value of forecast news (FN, defined as management forecast minus average analyst forecast scaled by pre-release price) is in the bottom 
quintile of the sample distribution.  
 
  
All management 
forecasts  
Management forecasts 
before insider sales  
Management forecasts 
before insider purchases  
Management forecasts not 
followed by insider trading 
 N % N % N % N % 
Good news forecasts  3,555 32.92% 1,163 41.08% 401 28.30% 1,991 30.39% 
Bad news forecasts  5,067 46.92% 877 30.98% 743 52.43% 3,447 52.62% 
Neutral forecasts  2,177 20.16% 791 27.94% 273 19.27% 1,113 16.99% 
   
Total  10,799 100% 2,831 100% 1,417 100% 6,551 100% 
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TABLE 2  
Descriptive Statistics 
This table provides descriptive statistics on key variables for the sample of 10,799 management earnings forecasts issued in the period 1999-2006. Please see 
the Appendix for variable definitions. 
  Percentile  
   Mean 5% 25% 50% 75% 95% Std. Dev.
Forecast Width (Width)  0.117 0 0.018 0.053 0.121 0.462 0.211 
Forecast Precision (Precision)  -0.117 -0.462 -0.121 -0.053 -0.018 0 0.211 
Management Forecast News (FN)  -0.001 -0.011 -0.003 -0.001 0.002 0.006 0.005
Insider Sell (InsiderSell)  0.262 0 0 0 1 1 0.440 
Insider Buy (InsiderBuy)  0.131 0 0 0 0 1 0.337 
Management Forecast Error (FE)  0.003 0 0.0004 0.001 0.003 0.010 0.005 
Firm Profitability (Loss)  0.073 0 0 0 0 1 0.260 
Management Forecast Horizon (Horizon)  124 33 84 92 122 354 88 
Return Volatility (RetVol)  0.027 0.011 0.018 0.024 0.033 0.056 0.014 
Research and Development Expenditures (R&D)  0.051 0 0 0 0.069 0.243 0.093
Analyst Following (Analyst)  8.210 3 4 6 11 20 7.630
Institutional Holding (INST)  0.651 0 0.537 0.705 0.832 0.945 0.245 
Firm Growth (M/B)  3.642 1.075 1.787 2.662 4.146 10.019 3.274
Firm Size (Size)  9,235 205 693 1,938 6,316 39,083 28,610
Fair Disclosure (FD)  0.937 0 1 1 1 1 0.243 
Litigation (Litig)  0.298 0 0 0 1 1 0.458 
Management Optimism (Optimism)  0.305 0 0 0 1 1 0.460 
Past Management Forecast Precision (PPrecision)  0.300 0 0.045 0.2 0.484 1 0.305 
Equity Issuance (EquIssue)  0.010 0 0 0 0 0 0.084 
Annual Forecast (Annual) 0.351 0 0 0 1 1 0.477 
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TABLE 3  
Correlation Matrix 
 
This table reports the correlations among independent variables for the sample of 10,799 management earnings forecasts issued in the period 1999-2006. All 
variables are defined in the Appendix. *, ** indicate significance at the 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively, based on two-tailed tests. 
 
 FN (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) 
InsiderSell (2) 0.15**                 
InsiderBuy (3) -0.02* -0.23**                
FE (4) -0.09** -0.06** 0.01               
Loss (5) -0.30** -0.06** -0.01 0.30**              
Horizon (6) 0.15** 0.05** 0.05** 0.09** -0.08**             
RetVol (7) -0.21** -0.03** -0.03** 0.11** 0.36** -0.18**            
R&D (8) -0.13** 0.05** -0.04** 0.04** 0.35** -0.10** 0.31**           
Analyst (9) -0.02 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.06** -0.01 0.12**          
INST (10) 0.06** 0.09** -0.01 -0.04** -0.09** -0.03** -0.07** -0.03** 0.07**         
M/B (11)  0.07** 0.10** -0.01 -0.13* -0.05** -0.01 0.05** 0.14** 0.06** -0.03**        
Size (12) 0.17** 0.03** 0.03** -0.18** -0.21** 0.06** -0.36** -0.05** 0.34** 0.03** 0.27**   
FD (13) 0.08** 0.06** -0.04** 0.02* 0.01 0.06** -0.16** 0.01 0.01 0.10** -0.11** -0.04**      
Litigation (14) -0.05** 0.07** -0.03** 0.02* 0.14** -0.09** 0.35** 0.51** 0.12** -0.01 0.13** -0.01 -0.01     
Optimism (15) 0.01 -0.09** 0.05** 0.20** 0.10** 0.17** 0.03** -0.05** 0.01 -0.06** -0.05** -0.04** -0.04** -0.04**    
PPrecision (16) -0.01 -0.02* 0.01 -0.04** 0.03** -0.07** 0.20** 0.10** 0.08** 0.01 0.15** 0.17** -0.35** 0.08** -0.01   
EquIssue (17) 0.03** 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.01* -0.01 0.01 -0.02** 0.01 -0.02* -0.02** -0.01  
Annual (18) 0.17** 0.00 0.04** -0.03** -0.12** 0.42** -0.27** -0.17** -0.08** -0.22** -0.01 0.10** 0.04** -0.15** 0.16** -0.09** -0.02* 
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TABLE 4  
Managerial Incentives and Management Forecast Precision: Tests of H1 
 
This table reports regression analysis of the impact of insider trading on the relation between forecast 
news and forecast precision. Panel A is based on the continuous variable of forecast news and Panel B 
is based on the sign of forecast news. The regressions are estimated based on 10,799 management 
forecasts issued in the period 1999-2006. Please see the Appendix for variable measurements. 
P-values are based on one-sided tests for coefficients with predicted signs and are based on two-sided 
tests for other coefficients. We use firm-clustering adjusted standard errors to calculate p-values. 
 
Panel A: Regressions based on continuous variable of forecast news 
This table reports regression results from the following model: 




VariablesControlδInsiderBuyFNInsiderBuy
lInsiderSelFNlInsiderSelFNPrecision
54
3210      (1) 
   Model (1)  Model (2) 
Variable 
Pred.  
sign  Coeff. P-Value  Coeff. P-Value 
Intercept ?  -0.261 0.001 -0.264 0.001
FN +  4.748 0.001 4.003 0.001
InsiderSell +  0.008 0.059 0.009 0.027
FN × InsiderSell +  7.866 0.001
InsiderBuy -  -0.002 0.371 -0.011 0.037
FN × InsiderBuy -  -5.316 0.001
Forecast Error -  -1.508 0.071 -1.512 0.067
Loss -  -0.117 0.001 -0.117 0.001
Forecast Horizon -  -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001
Return Volatility -  -1.198 0.001 -1.217 0.001
R&D -  -0.188 0.001 -0.184 0.001
Analyst Coverage +  -0.006 0.954 -0.006 0.975
INST +  0.060 0.001 0.059 0.001
M/B +  0.002 0.008 0.002 0.007
Size +  0.017 0.001 0.018 0.001
FD -  -0.010 0.102 -0.008 0.141
Litigation -  -0.008 0.159 -0.008 0.132
Optimism ?  -0.012 0.011 -0.012 0.011
Previous Precision +  0.102 0.001 0.102 0.001
Equity Issuance ?  -0.094 0.053 -0.095 0.049
Annual ?  0.086 0.001 0.085 0.001
FN × FN -  -33.417 0.236 -77.166 0.056
FN × Litigation +  3.442 0.014 3.474 0.011
FN × Forecast Horizon ?  0.991 0.280 1.141 0.211
FN × Loss ?  -8.551 0.001 -8.894 0.001
FN × Equity Issuance +  17.864 0.047 18.643 0.038
Adjusted R2   21.07% 21.87% 
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TABLE 4 (cont’d) 
 
Panel B: Regressions based on the sign of forecast news 
This table reports regression results from the following model: 






VariablesControlδBadInsiderBuyGoodInsiderBuyInsiderBuy
BadlInsiderSelGoodlInsiderSellInsiderSel
BadGoodPrecision
232221
131211
020100   (1') 
Good is an indicator variable that is 1 for management forecasts that are classified as good news and 
Bad is an indicator variable that is 1 for management forecasts that are classified as bad news. Other 
management forecasts are neutral forecasts. Good (bad, neutral) news forecasts refer to management 
forecasts for which the point estimate, or the mid-point of a range forecast, is above (below, similar 
to) the average of the analyst forecasts issued in the 90 days before the management forecast release 
date. Management forecasts are classified as neutral news if the absolute value of forecast news (FN, 
defined as management forecast minus average analyst forecast scaled by pre-release price) is in the 
bottom quintile of the sample distribution.  
Variable Pred. sign  Coeff. P-Value 
Intercept ?  -0.217 0.001 
Good +   -0.008 0.878 
Bad -   -0.058 0.001 
InsiderSell +  0.005 0.107 
InsiderSell × Good +   0.015 0.005 
InsiderSell × Bad -   -0.023 0.035 
InsiderBuy -  -0.003 0.270 
InsiderBuy × Good -   -0.034 0.005 
InsiderBuy × Bad +   0.021 0.011 
Forecast Error -  -1.360 0.079 
Loss -  0.009 0.568 
Forecast Horizon -  -0.001 0.001 
Return Volatility -  -1.223 0.001 
R&D -  -0.179 0.001 
Analyst Coverage +  -0.003 0.841 
INST +  0.057 0.001 
M/B +  0.001 0.071 
Size +  0.015 0.001 
FD -  -0.005 0.246 
Litigation -  0.018 0.995 
Optimism ?  -0.004 0.327 
Previous Precision +   0.094 0.001 
Equity Issuance ?   -0.092 0.344 
Annual ?   0.087 0.001 
Good × Litigation +  -0.012 0.930 
Bad × Litigation -  -0.064 0.001 
Good × Forecast Horizon ?  -0.015 0.008 
Bad × Forecast Horizon ?  -0.010 0.166 
Good × Loss ?  -0.132 0.047 
Bad × Loss ?  -0.079 0.141 
Good × Equity Issuance +   0.095 0.175 
Bad × Equity Issuance -   -0.170 0.146 
Adjusted R2    22.72%  
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TABLE 5  
Managerial Incentives and Management Forecast Precision, Conditioning Analyses: Test of H2-H4 
 
This table reports regression results from the following model: 








VariablesControlδVariablengConditioniInsiderBuyFNInsiderBuyFNInsideBuy
VariablengConditionilInsiderSelFNlInsiderSelFNlInsiderSel
FNPrecision
323130
222120
10
      (2) 
Conditioning_Variable is one of the three conditioning variables: IH, DRISK, and DIFF. IH is the decile rank of institutional ownership standardized to [0,1] 
(with IH=0 for firms with the lowest decile of institutional ownership and IH=1 for firms with the highest decile of institutional ownership). DRISK is an 
indicator variable for high disclosure risk and it equals 1 if the forecast before insider purchases is bad news or if the forecast before insider sales is good 
news, and 0 otherwise. DIFF is the decile rank of the difficulty level of assessing the precision of managers’ information standardized to [0,1] (with DIFF=0 
for firms with the lowest decile of difficulty level and DIFF=1 for firms with the highest decile of difficulty level). Please see the Appendix for variable 
measurements. The regression is estimated based on 10,799 management forecasts issued in the period 1999-2006. P-values are based on one-sided tests for 
coefficients with predicted signs and are based on two-sided tests for other coefficients. We use firm-clustering adjusted standard errors to calculate p-values. 
 Pred.  Model (1)  Model (2)  Model (3)  Model (4) 
 sign  Coeff. P-Value Coeff. P-Value  Coeff. P-Value Coeff. P-Value
Intercept ?  -0.264 0.001 -0.260 0.001  -0.245 0.001 -0.244 0.001 
FN +  4.058 0.001 5.277 0.001  3.868 0.001 5.003 0.001 
InsiderSell +  0.010 0.014 0.042 0.001  0.009 0.027 0.038 0.001 
FN × InsiderSell  +  12.855 0.001 18.158 0.001  2.046 0.144 18.991 0.001 
FN × InsiderSell×IH -  -9.992 0.004  -7.986 0.011 
FN × InsiderSell×DRISK -  -23.944 0.001  -22.315 0.001 
FN × InsiderSell×DIFF +   9.064 0.003 3.225 0.124 
InsiderBuy -  -0.012 0.032 0.018 0.990  -0.012 0.024 0.017 0.981 
FN × InsiderBuy  -  -6.951 0.001 -17.977 0.001  -2.204 0.070 -16.698 0.001 
FN × InsiderBuy×IH +  4.039 0.043  4.315 0.048 
FN × InsiderBuy×DRISK +  16.774 0.001  18.459 0.001 
FN × InsiderBuy×DIFF -   -3.997 0.029 -5.021 0.033 
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TABLE 5 (Cont’d) 
 
 Pred.  Model (1)  Model (2)  Model (3)  Model (4) 
 sign  Coeff. P-Value Coeff. P-Value  Coeff. P-Value Coeff. P-Value 
DRISK ?  -0.011 0.056  -0.006 0.327 
DIFF ?   -0.042 0.001 -0.039 0.001 
Forecast Error -  -1.524 0.063 -1.275 0.099  -1.366 0.086 -1.153 0.120 
Loss -  -0.119 0.001 -0.114 0.001  -0.118 0.001 -0.115 0.001 
Forecast Horizon -  -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001  -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001 
Return Volatility -  -1.225 0.001 -1.133 0.001  -0.358 0.165 -0.341 0.174 
R&D -  -0.185 0.001 -0.191 0.001  -0.190 0.001 -0.198 0.001 
Analyst Coverage +  -0.006 0.971 -0.005 0.923  -0.006 0.965 -0.004 0.913 
INST +  0.060 0.001 0.058 0.001  0.059 0.001 0.060 0.001 
M/B +  0.002 0.007 0.002 0.026  0.002 0.012 0.001 0.033 
Size +  0.017 0.001 0.017 0.001  0.016 0.001 0.015 0.001 
FD -  -0.008 0.144 -0.009 0.106  -0.018 0.009 -0.018 0.009 
Litigation -  -0.009 0.125 -0.010 0.094  -0.008 0.131 -0.010 0.096 
Optimism ?  -0.011 0.014 -0.010 0.028  -0.011 0.014 -0.010 0.032 
Previous Precision +  0.102 0.001 0.099 0.001  0.104 0.001 0.102 0.001 
Equity Issuance ?  -0.096 0.024 -0.095 0.049  -0.095 0.048 -0.095 0.048 
Annual ?  0.085 0.001 0.086 0.001  0.092 0.001 0.094 0.001 
FN × FN -  -83.759 0.039 70.508 0.927  -67.709 0.072 66.859 0.921
FN × Litigation +  3.227 0.016 3.275 0.015  3.730 0.007 3.394 0.011
FN × Forecast Horizon ?  1.194 0.189 1.275 0.163  1.114 0.218 1.309 0.147
FN × Loss ?  -9.201 0.001 -8.400 0.001  -9.034 0.001 -8.480 0.001 
FN × Equity Issuance +  18.486 0.041 19.206 0.031  17.815 0.043 18.546 0.035 
Adjusted R2   22.13% 22.81%  22.59% 23.57%  
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TABLE 6  
Forecast Precision and Market Response to Management Forecasts 
 
This table reports regression results from the following model:  
  VariablesδControlPrecisionFNβPrecisionFNRet 3210    (3) 
Ret is the event period abnormal return for the management earnings forecast, measured as the 
cumulative daily return minus the size-decile-matched market return from the day of management 
forecast to one day after. The regression is estimated based on 10,799 management forecasts issued in 
the period 1999-2006. Please see the Appendix for variable measurements. We use the decile ranks of 
Precision and control variables (except UE and Multiple) and standardize the ranks to the range of 
[0,1]. P-values are based on one-sided tests for coefficients with predicted signs and are based on 
two-sided tests for other coefficients. We use firm-clustering adjusted standard errors to calculate 
p-values. 
 
Variable Pred. sign Coeff. P-Value 
Intercept ? -0.004 0.286  
FN + 5.126 0.001  
Precision ? 0.011 0.001  
FN × Precision + 0.412 0.046  
Size ? -0.007 0.023  
FN × Size - -1.254 0.001  
M/B ? -0.010 0.001  
FN × M/B + 0.537 0.002  
RetVol ? -0.003 0.292  
FN × RetVol + 0.008 0.484  
Multiple ? 0.008 0.001  
FN × Multiple - -0.323 0.002  
PAccuracy ? -0.002 0.433  
FN ×PAccuracy + -0.125 0.767  
Annual ? 0.009 0.001  
FN × Annual - -4.455 0.001  
UE + 0.225 0.100  
UE × Size - -0.563 0.028  
UE × M/B + 0.557 0.041  
    
Adjusted R2  11.41%  
 
